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From Our Readers 
Making the Contract Type Fit the 
Program 
Republican Sen. John McCain of Arizona, the vice 
chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
recently proposed limiting the Pentagon to fixed-price 
contracts for weapon programs. In considering this 
proposal, it is worth reviewing available contract types 
and past policy in applying contract types. 
First, the two main contract types are fixed-price and 
cost-plus. Fixed-price contracts place greater risk on 
defense contractors to deliver a weapon system at a 
quoted cost. If uncertainty exists, contractor propos-
als can be expected to have higher prices to com-
pensate for any added risk. Cost-plus contracts allow 
the government and contractor to share risk by giv-
ing the government the option to continue funding a 
weapon program above a contractor's initial estimate. 
Second, past reform initiatives appear to follow the 
swings of a pendulum. In the mid-1960s, for exam-
ple, the objective of "Total Procurement" was to trans-
fer more risk to defense contractors by competitively 
bidding fixed-price contracts over both development 
and production phases of a weapon system. The ex-
pected advantages included avoiding "low-ball" bid-
ding of development contracts, and obtaining pro-
duction price commitments from contractors. The 
focus on awarding more fixed-price contracts resulted 
in cost-plus contracts going from the most common 
contract type to less than 5 percent of Air Force pro-
curement dollars by 1966, according to G. Brunner 
and G. Hall in a 1968 publication "Air Force Procure-
ment Practices 1964-1966." Problems with Total Pro-
curement resulted in a July 1969 memorandum by 
then Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard ad-
vocating cost-plus contracts for development and 
fixed-price contracts for production of weapon sys-
tems. This gUidance appears to have remained con-
sistent until 1980, when the emphasis shifted again 
toward fixed-price contracts for all phases of a weapon 
program. The use of a fixed-price contract proved to 
be a mistake on the now successful Advanced Medium 
Range Air-to-Air Missile development contract. 
Awarded in 1981, the AMRAAM contract experienced 
significant cost growth and schedule delays that led 
to a complete restructuring of the program by 1985. 
Current practice is consistent with then Deputy Sec-
retary of Defense Frank Carlucci's reform initiative 
from 1981 that advocated the use of appropriate con-
tract types. 
In general, fixed-price contracts are more appropri-
ate for production contracts where costs are either 
known or easily predicted, and cost-plus contracts 
are more appropriate in situations-such as devel-
opment-where costs are uncertain. Over time, safe-
guards have also been established to avoid defense 
contractor misuse of cost-plus contracts. For exam-
ple, government personnel with the Defense Contract 
Management Agency provide on-site inspections of 
defense contractor facilities and work, and Defense 
Contract Audit Agency personnel perform audits of 
contract costs to ensure they are appropriate. 
In light of available safeguards, a review of past re-
form efforts suggests that mandating a single con-
tract type is not better than matching the unique cir-
cumstances of a weapon program with an appropriate 
contract type. 
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